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INTRODUCTION 
The hallmark of Judge Posner’s class action decisions is rig-
orous review to ensure that aggregate litigation serves the best 
interests of class members and does not unduly pressure defend-
ants to settle. Although he championed class actions, especially 
as a way to provide efficient justice in cases involving numerous 
small claims, Posner also recognized that, because of the agency 
problems that pervade class action litigation, ordinary adversary 
procedures were not sufficient to protect class members.1 As a re-
sult, the judge had to act as a fiduciary for the class, especially 
when approving settlements and fee awards.2 In addition, the co-
lossal liabilities potentially imposed by a class action meant that 
a defendant might settle even if the case had little merit, so judi-
cial scrutiny—in particular interlocutory appellate review of cer-
tification decisions—was necessary to protect defendants.3 
While Judge Posner’s rigorous review of class action litiga-
tion is sometimes misconstrued as hostility to class actions gen-
erally, this is not correct. It is true that, in his most famous and 
influential class action opinion, In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Inc,4 Judge Posner refused to certify a class and provided 
new and powerful tools for defendants to resist class certification.5 
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 1 See Creative Montessori Learning Centers v Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F3d 913, 917–
18 (7th Cir 2011); In the Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F2d 566, 
573 (7th Cir 1992). 
 2 See, for example, Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277, 279–80 (7th 
Cir 2002). 
 3 See, for example, CE Design Ltd v King Architectural Metals, Inc, 637 F3d 721, 
723 (7th Cir 2011); In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1297–99 (7th 
Cir 1995). 
 4 51 F3d 1293 (7th Cir 1995). 
 5 Id at 1299–1303. 
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Nevertheless, in numerous other opinions, he extolled the bene-
fits of class action litigation and provided arguments and innova-
tive strategies to facilitate class certification, to provide for effec-
tive distribution of awards to class members, and to ensure full 
compensation to class lawyers.6 
Economic analysis provided the analytic framework for most of 
Posner’s class action jurisprudence. Class actions were, in Posner’s 
view, particularly important when numerous persons suffered 
small but similar injuries. Without class actions, those cases 
would not be brought, and similar wrongs, potentially large in the 
aggregate, would not be deterred. As Posner famously quipped, 
“only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”7 In addition to allowing 
small-claims suits to be brought, class actions can “yield substan-
tial economies in litigation” by eliminating duplicative legal ex-
penses for both plaintiffs and defendants.8 These arguments in 
favor of class actions reflect views that Posner articulated decades 
earlier in his seminal economic analysis of procedure.9 
The need for strict scrutiny of class actions also reflects eco-
nomic considerations, principally agency costs. The lawyer is the 
client’s agent. Even in ordinary litigation, it is difficult for a client 
to effectively monitor and control the lawyer to ensure that the 
lawyer acts in the client’s best interest. That problem is aggra-
vated in class actions, in which the lawyer effectively chooses the 
clients (the named representatives and the class) and in which 
individual class members, including the named representatives, 
usually have such small stakes that they have no incentive to 
monitor and control their lawyers. As a result, class lawyers may 
be tempted to enter into sweetheart deals, which provide ample 
fees to the lawyers, paltry compensation to class members, and 
minimal deterrence of future wrongdoing. This problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that there may be competing class actions or 
competing class action lawyers, so defendants may be able to play 
the lawyers off against each other in a “reverse auction” in order 
to negotiate an inexpensive settlement that bars concurrent and 
future litigation. Although the agency problems in class actions 
 
 6 See, for example, Butler v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 727 F3d 796, 799 (7th Cir 2013); 
Carnegie v Household International, Inc, 376 F3d 656, 660–62 (7th Cir 2004); In the Matter 
of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 962 F2d 566, 570–71 (7th Cir 1992). 
 7 Carnegie, 376 F3d at 661. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 349–50 (Little, Brown 1973); 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 
2 J Legal Stud 399, 438–41 (1973). 
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were most thoroughly documented by scholars such as Professors 
John Coffee, Jonathan Macey, and Geoffrey Miller,10 whose con-
tributions Posner acknowledged,11 recognition of the conflict-of-
interest problem inherent in class actions also goes back to Posner’s 
pre-judicial academic writings.12 
In part because of his reliance on economic analysis, Posner 
had little use for traditional legal materials, including the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and Supreme Court precedents. 
Posner’s opinions dug deeply into the facts to determine whether 
a class action was the best way to handle the claims and whether 
settlements reflected the merits of the case. While he did his best 
to explain how the rules and precedents could be interpreted to 
support his economic approach, he seldom engaged in careful 
analysis of the FRCP or case law but rather structured his opin-
ions around his view of the crucial issues, occasionally tying his 
analysis back to authoritative legal sources. In his later, more 
candid years on the bench, which one lawyer called his “late dec-
adent period,”13 Posner showed disdain for traditional legal rea-
soning and suggested that judges follow “common sense [ ], for-
getting about the law” unless there was a statute or binding 
precedent blocking the sensible result.14 Posner advocated this ap-
proach explicitly in class actions, flatly admitting, “I don’t get a 
lot out of Rule 23. . . . Actually reading Rule 23, I just get lost in 
all the detail and the subsections.”15 Instead, he defended a “ho-
listic” approach, which asks, “‘Is this an efficient way to deal with 
the dispute?’ ‘Is there a real class, a lot of people with a common 
interest?’ ‘Is their representation competent?’ ‘Are there clearly 
focused issues?’”16 
 
 10 See generally John C. Coffee Jr, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and  
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1 (1991). 
 11 See, for example, Reynolds, 288 F3d at 279, 282; Eubank v Pella Corp, 753 F3d 
718, 719, 725, 728 (7th Cir 2014). 
 12 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 350 (cited in note 9); Posner, 
2 J Legal Stud at 440–41 (cited in note 9). 
 13 Perry Cooper, Posner: Class Action Rules, Constitution Overrated (Bloomberg Law, 
Oct 28, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6A8Q-ZZEN (quoting “[p]laintiffs’ attorney Benjamin 
Gould of Keller Rohrback LLP [on] Twitter . . . [as] saying he is enjoying ‘Posner’s late 
decadent period’”). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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The influence of Posner’s opinions on the development of 
class action case law and scholarship can be measured through 
citation analysis, but other methods better capture their true im-
pact. A key vehicle of Posner’s influence has been, ironically, re-
visions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which Posner 
mocked for its confusing “detail and [ ] subsections.”17 When Posner 
came to the bench in 1981, the class action rules had not been 
revised since the 1966 amendments, which opened the way for 
mass tort litigation.18 Judge Posner’s 1995 decision in Rhone- 
Poulenc was the primary impetus for the 1998 amendments that 
allowed discretionary interlocutory appeals of orders granting or 
denying class certification.19 Posner’s decision was almost cer-
tainly also the source for the provision in the notes that justified 
that review, in part, by “the risk of potentially ruinous liability,”20 
as that danger was a key argument in Rhone-Poulenc.21 The 2003 
and 2018 amendments also reflect Posner’s influence, this time 
on the importance of rigorous judicial scrutiny of settlements, 
competent class counsel, and “[a]ctive judicial involvement in 
measuring fee awards.”22 While the Committee Notes are written 
in an arid style that conceals what influenced committee deliber-
ations, Posner’s impact is clear both in the hearings23 and in the 
unofficial comments of committee and subcommittee members. 
Judge Anthony J. Scirica, for example, in discussing the 1998 
 
 17 Cooper, Posner: Class Action Rules (cited in note 13). 
 18 Amendments in 1987 were “technical. No substantive change [was] intended.” 
FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1987 Amendments. 
 19 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash U L Rev 729, 733 (2013) 
(“A critical event leading to Rule 23(f) and CAFA occurred in 1995 when the Seventh Circuit 
decided In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.”). 
 20 FRCP 23(f), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1998 Amendments. 
 21 See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1299. 
 22 FRCP 23(h), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments. See also 
FRCP 23(e), (g); FRCP 23(e), (g), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 and 2018  
Amendments. 
 23 See, for example, Hearing before the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, 114th Cong, 2d Sess (Tab 1) 3, 11 (Nov 2016) (statement of DRI: The Voice of 
the Defense Bar) (noting that its defense bar members protect clients against “potentially 
ruinous, and many times frivolous, lawsuit[s],” and advocating that “[d]ecisions on class 
certification motions should be subject to immediate and mandatory appellate review”); id 
at 7 (statement of John Sweeney) (quoting Judge Posner in his criticism of cy pres awards); 
Hearing before the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 115th Cong, 
1st Sess 3 (Jan 2017) (statement of Public Justice) (quoting Judge Posner to begin its dis-
cussion of class actions’ deterrent value); Hearing before the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules, 115th Cong, 1st Sess, (Tab 7) 4, 12, 13, 16 (Feb 2017) (statement 
of Competitive Enterprise Institute) (explicitly referencing Posner in its discussion on how 
to improve settlement processes). 
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amendment that allowed discretionary interlocutory appeals, 
noted: 
Judge Posner’s jurisprudence, and the Rhone-Poulenc case in 
particular, was of great interest to the rules makers and was 
a defining moment in the way we looked at mass claims . . . 
[N]o case had articulated the problems to the same degree of 
detail and persuasiveness as Judge Posner.24 
Similarly, Judge Robert Dow stated that Judge Posner was a 
“looming presence” in deliberations regarding the 2018 amend-
ments because “many of the issues . . . came out of his opinions.”25 
Judge Posner influenced not only the rules but also class ac-
tion lawyers. Elizabeth Cabraser, a leading class action lawyer 
whose offices are in San Francisco, far from the direct supervision 
of the Seventh Circuit, confessed: 
I did not read all of these [Posner class action] decisions in 
preparation for the [symposium] panel today, but I can tell 
you that I read every single one of them in real time when 
they came out, beginning with actually the second one, 
Rhone-Poulenc, because throughout my class actions prac-
tice, Judge Posner, more than any single jurist, has essen-
tially been the boss of me. . . . We ask, “What would Richard 
Posner do?” Or, more to the point, “How would Richard Posner 
rule?” And that has been salutary.26 
It is hard to imagine any other appellate judge whom a lawyer 
based in another circuit would have paid such close attention to, 
reading his class action opinions as they were handed down and 
asking, in internal deliberations, how he would rule. In addition, 
the fact that she, as a plaintiff’s lawyer, considers his influence 
overall to have been “salutary” confirms that Posner was con-
cerned at least as much with ensuring that injured class members 
 
 24 Columbia Law School, Posner on Class Actions, First Panel: Class Certification, at 
0:07, 0:18, online at http://cdnapisec.kaltura.com/html5/html5lib/v2.53/mwEmbedFrame 
.php/p/1758691/uiconf_id/38497331/entry_id/0_p09uk61t?wid=_1758691&iframeembed= 
true&playerId=kaltura_player&entry_id=0_p09uk61t&flashvars[streamerType]=auto 
(visited May 11, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 25 Columbia Law School, Posner on Class Actions, Second Panel: Class Settlement, 
Fees, Claims Administration, at 1:00, online at http://cdnapisec.kaltura.com/html5/ 
html5lib/v2.53/mwEmbedFrame.php/p/1758691/uiconf_id/38497331/entry_id/0_qtydlwlt?wid 
=_1758691&iframeembed=true&playerId=kaltura_player&entry_id=0_qtydlwlt&flashvars 
[streamerType]=auto (visited May 11, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable).  
 26 Id at 1:06–1:08. 
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were competently represented as with protecting defendants from 
coercive settlements, if not more. 
The rest of this Essay will amplify some of the themes 
touched on by this Introduction. Part I will discuss Posner’s cer-
tification decisions, with special emphasis on Rhone-Poulenc. 
Part II will analyze decisions on settlements and related issues 
(such as lawyer fees). Posner’s influence will be analyzed through 
citation analysis in Part III. Other themes in the Introduction—
such as Posner’s use of economics, his disdain for traditional legal 
reasoning, and his influence on the FRCP and lawyers—will be 
touched on only tangentially, as there is little to add to what is 
already written in this Introduction. 
I.  CERTIFICATION DECISIONS 
Rhone-Poulenc merits separate analysis. It is Posner’s most 
cited class action decision.27 It was the primary influence on the 
1998 FRCP Amendment allowing discretionary interlocutory ap-
peals of certification decisions. It was cited extensively in the 
hearings on the Class Action Fairness Act,28 and it provoked spir-
ited academic debate. 
The plaintiffs in Rhone-Poulenc were hemophiliacs infected 
by HIV as a consequence of using blood solids manufactured by 
the defendants.29 The district judge had certified a class with re-
spect to certain issues, and the defendants filed a petition for 
mandamus requesting appellate review.30 An ordinary appeal was 
not possible because certification of a class is not an appealable 
final order, and the Supreme Court had already decided, in Coopers 
& Lybrand v Livesay,31 that the collateral order doctrine, which 
carves out exceptions to the final order rule, does not apply.32 
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, which, as Posner recog-
nized, is supposed to be granted only when the district court “so 
 
 27 Westlaw search, citing references of Rhone-Polenc, Feb 2019 (listing 3,940 total 
citing references); Westlaw search, citing references of Carnegie v Household International, 
Inc, 376 F3d 656 (7th Cir 2004), Feb 2019 (listing 2,355 total citing references for Posner’s 
second most cited case). 
 28 See, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2000, S Rep No 106-420,106th Cong, 2d Sess 
18 (2000) (2000 CAFA Report) (statement of Sen Hatch); id at 57 (statement of Sen Leahy, 
et al). 
 29 In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1295–96 (7th Cir 1995). 
 30 Id at 1294. 
 31 437 US 463 (1978). 
 32 Id at 469. 
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far exceed[ed] the proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be le-
gitimately considered usurpative in character, or in violation of a 
clear and indisputable legal right, or, at the very least, patently 
erroneous.”33 The district court judge’s decision may well have 
been erroneous and ill-advised, but it is hard to characterize as 
“usurpative” or “patently erroneous.” It was not like the Eastern 
District of Texas’s patent venue decisions, which tried to attract 
and keep as many infringement cases as possible in that district 
and which were thus properly the subject of repeated mandamus 
decisions by the Federal Circuit.34 Nor was the district court judge 
in Rhone-Poulenc so incompetent that his decision was patently 
erroneous. Posner had to advance several novel theories in order 
to demonstrate the trial judge’s error, and, as discussed in detail 
below, all have been subject to substantial academic critique. Ra-
ther, Posner clearly thought it would be better for certification 
decisions to be subject to more frequent and careful appellate re-
view, and he was willing to bend mandamus doctrine to make that 
possible. 
History has largely vindicated Posner’s view. Several other 
appellate courts soon followed Posner’s lead, and, as noted above, 
three years later, the Rules Committee amended the FRCP to al-
low discretionary appellate review without recourse to a writ of 
mandamus. Allowing appellate review of certification decisions 
has had a profound influence on class action jurisprudence, as 
certification decisions had previously been practically unreview-
able. Because most class actions settle, the final judgment rule 
meant that very few certification decisions would ever be subject 
to appellate review. While 28 USC § 1292(b) allows appellate re-
view of interlocutory decisions when both the trial judge and ap-
pellate court desire it, most trial judges are reluctant to voluntar-
ily subject themselves to appellate review that could be otherwise 
avoided. By allowing appellate review of certification decisions, 
Rhone-Poulenc and the 1998 FRCP Amendment made possible 
the sort of rigorous review of class action decisions that Posner 
himself advocated. Without interlocutory review, Posner and 
other appellate judges would simply have been unable to examine 
the merits of the certification decision in the vast majority of 
cases. 
 
 33 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1295. 
 34 See Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S Cal L Rev 241,  
260–61 (2016). 
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Posner based his decision on three main arguments. The 
first, which is clearly where Posner’s heart lay, involved the dan-
ger that certification would coerce the defendants into settling a 
case that Posner thought was very weak.35 The danger of such a 
coercive settlement both provided a reason for interlocutory re-
view—because if the case settled, no appeal could later be taken 
on the certification issue—and showed why injustice would result 
if certification were not reversed. 
Posner’s second argument was that Rhone-Poulenc was a 
class action based on state law, but state laws vary on relevant 
legal issues.36 A key issue, for example, was whether it was negli-
gence for the defendants not to heat their blood or screen donors to 
avoid contamination with Hepatitis B, and whether this negligence 
with respect to Hepatitis B also made the defendant negligent 
with respect to plaintiffs in this case.37 That was an issue that 
different state courts might decide differently because the plain-
tiffs in this case were not infected with Hepatitis B, but the same 
precautions that would have been effective against Hepatitis B 
would have “serendipitously” protected them against HIV.38 So 
Posner argued that, to resolve the case, the trial judge would have 
to give “a kind of Esperanto instruction, merging the negligence 
standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia,”39 thus 
violating the command of Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins40 for fed-
eral courts to apply state law rather than a specially created fed-
eral common law.41 
Posner’s third argument was that the division of issues be-
tween the class action and later individual cases would violate the 
Seventh Amendment because subsequent juries, who would have 
to decide issues such as comparative negligence and proximate 
causation, would have to implicitly reexamine the class action 
jury’s determination of the defendant’s negligence.42 
Each of these arguments has been subject to critique. The ar-
gument that certification would coerce settlements has received 
the most attention from law-and-economics scholars. Some schol-
ars disputed whether liability in the Rhone-Poulenc case itself 
 
 35 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1299. 
 36 Id at 1300. 
 37 Id at 1296. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1300. 
 40 304 US 64 (1938). 
 41 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1300, citing Erie, 304 US at 78–80. 
 42 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1302–03. 
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was likely to be so ruinous as to lead the defendant to settle on 
unfavorable terms.43 Similarly, one can argue that ruinous liabil-
ity is appropriate because the case against the defendants was 
much stronger than Posner assumed. Posner inferred that the 
class action was weak, in part, from the fact that the defendants 
had won twelve of thirteen individual cases (92.3 percent) that 
had gone to judgment. The importance Posner attributed to this 
statistic can be gleaned from the fact that he repeated it four 
times.44 Yet as Professor Charles Silver pointed out, Posner’s in-
ference from the litigated cases is itself undermined by the eco-
nomic analysis of litigation on which he otherwise relied heavily.45 
As Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein famously ar-
gued, litigated cases are not a random sample of all cases.46 While 
Priest and Klein argued that selection effects would ordinarily 
mean that only close cases would be litigated (resulting in a 50 
percent plaintiff trial win rate),47 they also pointed out that, when 
defendants have more at stake—as in Rhone-Poulenc, in which 
an adverse judgment could have collateral estoppel effects 
against the defendants (but not the plaintiffs)—defendants would 
selectively settle cases they were likely to lose and take their 
chances litigating only the cases they were confident they would 
win.48 Modern asymmetric-information theories of litigation like-
wise predict that informed defendants (like those in Rhone-Poulenc) 
will disproportionately settle the cases they are likely to lose and 
litigate only cases they think they can win.49 As a result, the de-
fendant’s 92.3 percent trial win rate may reflect the defendant’s 
strategic settlement decisions rather than the underlying merit 
of the class action.50 This speculation is confirmed by conversa-
tions with lawyers for hemophiliac patients, who asserted that a 
number of cases were, in fact, settled before Posner’s decision in 
 
 43 See, for example, Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 NYU L Rev 1357, 1376–78 (2003). 
 44 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1296, 1298–1300. 
 45 See Silver 78 NYU L Rev at 1378–79 (cited in note 43). 
 46 See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J Legal Stud 1, 14–15 (1984). 
 47 Id at 4–5, 17–20. 
 48 Id at 26. See also generally Yoon-Ho Alex Lee and Daniel Klerman, The Priest-
Klein Hypotheses: Proofs and Generality, 48 Intl Rev L & Econ 59 (2016). 
 49 See Abraham Wickelgren, Law and Economics of Settlement, in Jennifer Arlen, 
ed, Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts 344 (Elgar 2013). 
 50 The 92.3 percent win rate may, however, also reflect the underlying merit of the 
class action because selection effects are partial. See Daniel Klerman and Yoon-Ho Alex 
Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J Legal Stud 209, 210–11, 230–34 (2014). 
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Rhone-Poulenc and that defendants had been strategic in settling 
the cases plaintiffs were more likely to win, such as those involv-
ing favorable state law, young children (who are more sympa-
thetic), persons able to identify the transfusion lot they received 
(obviating issues relating to market-share liability), and those 
with later seroconversions (for whom the statute of limitations 
would present fewer difficulties).51 
While these arguments may suggest that Rhone-Poulenc it-
self was wrongly decided, they do not undermine the correctness 
of the precedent set by the case. Rhone-Poulenc may provide the 
correct framework for other cases, even if its holding was applied 
improperly in Rhone-Poulenc itself. A broader critique is that the 
problem of coercive settlements exists only if the defendant is risk 
averse.52 If the defendant were risk neutral, the expected value of 
a class settlement and numerous individual suits would be 
roughly the same (differing only on account of litigation costs). In 
fact, the defendant would likely underpay if potential liability ex-
ceeded the defendant’s assets, as the settlement would reflect the 
expected value of likely payments, not the expected value of judg-
ments it could not possibly pay. On the other hand, while diversi-
fied shareholders are plausibly risk neutral, the managers who 
actually make settlement decisions are likely to be risk averse, so 
pointing out that Posner’s argument presumes risk aversion does 
not really undermine its validity. 
Professor Warren Schwartz mounted a broader critique, ar-
guing that there is nothing wrong with large settlements induced 
by defendant risk aversion because settlements are just transfers 
from the defendant to the plaintiff, and there is no reason to pre-
fer a larger or smaller transfer.53 Schwartz concedes that “the in-
centive effect on the behavior of the parties” could provide a basis 
for discouraging larger payments reflecting risk aversion, but he 
then asserts that “[t]here is [ ] no systematic relationship between 
the amount of the transfer and any of the choices made by the 
parties in the events out of which the dispute arises.”54 While 
 
 51 Conversations between the author and Roy Spece, Jan 22, 1997, and July 27, 2018. 
See also Jay Tidmarsh, Mass Tort Settlement Class Actions: Five Case Studies 92 (Federal 
Judicial Center 1998). 
 52 See Silver, 78 NYU L Rev at 1374 (cited in note 43). See also Warren F. Schwartz, 
Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal Uncertainty, 8 Legal Theory 
297, 308–09 (2002). 
 53 See Schwartz, 8 Legal Theory at 308–09 (cited in note 52). 
 54 Id at 309. 
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Schwartz is correct that the magnitude of settlement cannot af-
fect the incentives of the defendant in the particular case which 
is settled, he ignores the effect of settlements on the future actions 
of those similarly situated. If class actions mean that settlements 
are generally larger than expected liability, they could induce de-
fendants to be inefficiently cautious, to charge higher prices for 
products, to remove some products from the market, or to reduce 
other activities that are, on net, beneficial to society. That is, set-
tlements that are too high, like damages that are too high, could 
result in inefficiency by inducing excessive precautions or by de-
pressing activity levels. 
Luke McCloud and Professor David Rosenberg take on Judge 
Posner’s second argument, that class certification is improper be-
cause it would require resolution of the case under “a law that is 
merely an amalgam, an averaging, of the nonidentical negligence 
laws of 51 jurisdictions.”55 McCloud and Rosenberg argue that av-
eraging is actually desirable because defendants who sell the 
same product in multiple states (as defendants in Rhone-Poulenc 
presumably did) must adjust their behavior and safety precau-
tions to the law of all affected jurisdictions anyway.56 In doing so, 
the rational defendant will not try to satisfy the law of the most 
stringent jurisdiction but will take into account expected liability 
as averaged across all states where it might be sued. Thus, de-
fendant actions implicitly reflect “average law,” so it is appropri-
ate that such amalgamated, synthetic law be applied in class ac-
tions and other multistate litigation.57 
The third argument, about the Seventh Amendment, has 
been thoroughly examined by Professor Patrick Woolley, who con-
cluded that, contrary to Posner’s opinion: 
The [Reexamination] Clause requires only that later juries 
respect the formal findings of the first jury. Within these 
broad parameters, the Clause does not prohibit later juries 
from independently evaluating evidence on a previously de-
cided issue in order to decide a related issue. For that reason, 
the Clause allows a jury charged with deciding the issue of 
comparative negligence to rehear evidence presented to an 
earlier jury on the defendant’s negligence, provided the later 
 
 55 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1302. 
 56 See Luke McCloud and David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law Problem 
of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 Geo Wash L Rev 374, 386 (2011). 
 57 Id. 
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jury understands that the formal findings of the earlier jury 
are binding.58 
Most other commentators and several courts have also rejected 
Posner’s Seventh Amendment arguments.59 
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of Posner’s ap-
proach, albeit one that he did not explicitly make because it does 
not fit within the doctrinal framework, is that appellate review of 
certification decisions is necessary to ensure the development of 
a body of case law on the subject. As noted above, because of the 
final order doctrine, certification decisions would hardly ever 
reach appellate courts without expansion of mandamus or some 
other mechanism overriding the final order doctrine. Appellate 
review is necessary not only to correct errors and prevent injus-
tice (as Posner argued) but also to generate a body of precedents 
that could guide district courts in the future. 
Those who are familiar only with Rhone-Poulenc could get the 
mistaken impression that Posner was generally hostile to class 
actions and was interested primarily in protecting defendants. 
That would ignore the many cases in which Posner pushed the 
law to facilitate class actions. He did so primarily in controversies 
involving a multitude of small claims, which otherwise would 
never result in suit. For Posner, Rhone-Poulenc was a different 
and unusual case because it involved plaintiffs whose claims were 
large enough that each could sue individually.60 The class action 
device was therefore unnecessary, although it might still econo-
mize on costs. 
Carnegie v Household International, Inc61 is illustrative of the 
many cases in which Posner upheld class certification.62 After 
Rhone-Poulenc, Carnegie is Judge Posner’s second most cited cer-
tification decision.63 The plaintiffs were recipients of tax refund 
 
 58 Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination 
Clause, 83 Iowa L Rev 499, 542 (1998). 
 59 See generally, for example, Simon v Philip Morris Inc, 200 FRD 21 (EDNY 2001); 
Douglas McNamara, Blake Boghossian, and Leila Aminpour, Reexamining the Seventh 
Amendment Argument against Issue Certification, 34 Pace L Rev 1041 (2014). See also, for 
example, Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 10) (“This Seventh Amendment 
objection seems a weak argument.”); Elizabeth F. Cabraser, Your Products Liability Hit 
Parade: A Class Torts “Top 20”, 37 Tort and Ins L J 169, 197 n 110 (2001) (citing cases and 
articles disagreeing with Posner’s analysis). 
 60 Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F3d at 1299. 
 61 376 F3d 656 (7th Cir 2004). 
 62 Id at 659. 
 63 See note 27. 
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anticipation loans who claimed that they had been fraudulently 
induced into taking on these high-interest debts.64 A global settle-
ment had been negotiated and then rejected by Posner and his 
Seventh Circuit colleagues in the Reynolds v Beneficial National 
Bank65 decision, discussed below.66 The court was “concerned that 
the settlement might have been the product of collusion between 
the defendants, eager to minimize their liability, and the class 
lawyers, eager to maximize their fees.”67 On remand, the judge to 
whom the case had been assigned then certified a very similar 
class action, albeit with different class action lawyers, and the de-
fendants appealed. Posner used the case as a vehicle for explain-
ing the benefits of small-claims class actions. In response to de-
fendants’ argument that the class would be unmanageable 
because it involved millions of class members, Posner asserted: 
That is no argument at all. The more claimants there are, the 
more likely a class action is to yield substantial economies in 
litigation. It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu 
of this single class action 17 million suits each seeking dam-
ages of $15 to $30. . . . The realistic alternative to a class ac-
tion is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual 
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30. But a class 
action has to be unwieldy indeed before it can be pronounced 
an inferior alternative—no matter how massive the fraud or 
other wrongdoing that will go unpunished if class treatment 
is denied—to no litigation at all.68 
That is, Posner was willing to tolerate an “unwieldy” and difficult-
to-manage class action if the alternative was that “massive [ ] 
fraud or other wrongdoing” would go “unpunished.” Posner then 
went on to list the many “imaginative solutions” that a district 
court judge could employ to render the case more manageable: 
(1) bifurcating liability and damage trials with the same or 
different juries; (2) appointing a magistrate judge or special 
master to preside over individual damages proceedings; 
(3) decertifying the class after the liability trial and providing 
notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to 
 
 64 Carnegie, 376 F3d at 658–59. 
 65 288 F3d 277 (7th Cir 2002). 
 66 See Carnegie, 376 F3d at 659 (discussing the history of the litigation and the Reynolds 
reversal). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id at 660–61. 
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prove damages; (4) creating subclasses; or (5) altering or 
amending the class.69 
If the class action would economize on litigation costs and allow 
possibly meritorious claims to be resolved, Posner encouraged the 
district court to be creative in administering the litigation rather 
than using management difficulties as an excuse not to certify. 
Posner also swatted away defendants’ numerous procedural 
objections—that the district court judge improperly put the bur-
den of proof regarding certification on the defendants, that certi-
fication was barred by collateral estoppel, and that the district 
court had made no findings on three of the four certification cri-
teria set out in FRCP 23(a): numerosity, commonality, and typi-
cality.70 When Posner thought justice would be served by class ac-
tion treatment, he would not allow procedural technicalities to 
stand in the way. 
The most plausible explanation for Judge Posner’s anti–class 
action ruling in Rhone-Poulenc and his pro–class action decision 
in Carnegie is the differences between the underlying facts. The 
high stakes in Rhone-Poulenc meant both that plaintiffs could sue 
individually and that liability might bankrupt the defendants, 
whereas the small stakes in Carnegie meant that only the class 
action device could punish and deter fraud. Nevertheless, it is also 
possible to see the cases as reflecting a change in Posner’s think-
ing about class actions. There is some quantitative support for 
that hypothesis. In his first two decades on the bench, the 1980s 
and 1990s, Judge Posner’s decisions overwhelmingly resulted in 
noncertification. Less than 20 percent (2/11) affirmed a district 
court’s certification decision or reversed a decision not to certify. 
In contrast, in the 2000s, that percentage rose to more than 40 
percent (6/14), and in the 2010s, the percentage rose to 50 percent 
(7/14).71 Thus, over his career, the percentage of procertification 
decisions more than doubled. Nevertheless, such numbers need to 
be interpreted with caution. They would mean that Posner’s 
views “evolved” only if the quality of cases reaching him remained 
 
 69 Id at 661, quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F3d 
124, 141 (2001). 
 70 Carnegie, 376 F3d at 661–64. 
 71 The methodology for arriving at these figures involved first identifying a sample 
of cases by searching for all opinions written by Posner that contained the phrase “class 
action.” My research assistants and I then read each of these cases to identify those deci-
sions bearing on class certification. Finally, we calculated the total number of those cases 
as well as the number and percentage of those cases that ruled favorably on class certifi-
cation, separating the results by decade. 
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the same. An alternative hypothesis is that, because of decisions 
like Rhone-Poulenc, class counsel became more careful about the 
class actions they brought, so those that reached appeal were 
more likely to merit certification. 
II.  SETTLEMENT APPROVALS AND RELATED ISSUES 
Judge Posner was exceptional in the degree of scrutiny with 
which he examined class settlements and related issues, such as 
fees to counsel and the distribution of settlement proceeds to the 
class. Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank72 is illustrative of such 
cases and is, deservedly, Posner’s most highly cited opinion relat-
ing to the approval of class action settlements.73 
As already mentioned, Reynolds involved tax refund antici-
pation loans that allegedly reflected self-dealing contrary to state-
ments that might have led customers to believe that the defend-
ants were fiduciaries.74 The lawyers for the class and the 
defendants entered into a $25 million settlement, which, even af-
ter modest revisions required by the district court judge, con-
tained a number of problematic features.75 Relief was limited to 
$15 per loan and $30 per plaintiff, which meant that plaintiffs 
who took out more than two loans would receive no additional 
compensation for the additional loans.76 There was scant evidence 
to support the idea that $25 million was a reasonable amount, 
especially in light of the fact that one of the defendants faced up 
to $2 billion in exposure in a Texas class action, which the settle-
ment would have enjoined.77 Furthermore, the lawyers in the 
Texas class action were forbidden from notifying members of the 
class about the status of the Texas litigation, thus denying the 
class members information that might have led them to opt out of 
the settlement.78 
Posner began his opinion by referring to “lawyers for the class 
who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary obliga-
tions, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the 
class.”79 He also reminded judges to “exercise the highest degree 
 
 72 288 F3d 277 (2002). 
 73 Westlaw search, citing references of Reynolds, Feb 2019 (listing 1,551 total citing 
references). 
 74 Reynolds, 288 F3d at 280. 
 75 Id at 281. 
 76 Id at 282. 
 77 Id at 283. 
 78 Reynolds, 288 F3d at 284. 
 79 Id at 279. 
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of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions,” 
calling the district court judge “a fiduciary of the class, who is 
subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of 
fiduciaries.”80 In the middle of the opinion, Posner referred to  
Professor Coffee’s “reverse auction” theory, “the practice whereby 
the defendant in a series of class actions picks the most ineffec-
tual class lawyers to negotiate a settlement with in the hope that 
the district court will approve a weak settlement that will pre-
clude other claims against the defendant.”81 While acknowledging 
that there was “no proof that the settlement [in the Reynolds case] 
was actually collusive in the reverse-auction sense,” Posner in-
sisted that “the circumstances demanded closer scrutiny.”82 
Judges, Posner argued, should make an effort to “quantify 
the net expected value” of the case so that they can evaluate 
whether the settlement is reasonable.83 Posner proceeded to do 
that and suggested that the case was worth at least double the 
amount of the proposed settlement.84 Posner also excoriated the 
settlement and district court judge for including in the scope of 
the release two other class actions making different, unrelated 
claims.85 Posner concluded the opinion by considering whether 
lawyers who made objections at the fairness hearing are entitled 
to a fee for having conferred a benefit on the class. Although the 
issue was moot because “the claim for attorneys’ fees falls with 
the settlement,” Posner devoted several paragraphs to the issue 
“for the sake of guidance for the future.”86 Such objectors are de-
sirable “because of the risk of collusion over attorneys’ fees and 
the terms of settlement generally,” so they should be incentivized 
through the award of attorneys’ fees.87 
Altogether, the opinion stands as a stunning rebuke to a dis-
trict court judge and a stern admonition to all district court judges 
to scrutinize settlements rigorously, with attention to conflicts of 
interest. District court judges are urged to expend significant ef-
fort to estimate the expected value of litigation so as to ascertain 
whether a settlement is, in fact, reasonable rather than a sweet-
heart deal that benefits primarily class lawyers (through fees) 
 
 80 Id at 279–80. 
 81 Id at 282. 
 82 Reynolds, 288 F3d at 283. 
 83 Id at 284. 
 84 Id at 285. 
 85 Id at 285–86. 
 86 Reynolds, 288 F3d at 288. 
 87 Id. 
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and defendants (by barring related concurrent and future litiga-
tion). The opinion also evinces distrust, if not contempt, for class 
action lawyers, who are presumed to act in their own interest ra-
ther than in the interest of the class. 
Although Posner was often suspicious of class action lawyers, 
he also believed that good ones were entitled to appropriate com-
pensation. In fact, a decision he wrote on that subject is even more 
heavily cited than the Reynolds decision just discussed. In the 
Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation,88 Posner re-
versed and remanded a case in which the district judge had cut 
the lawyer’s fee request in half.89 As Posner noted, “Having em-
ployed their professional skills to create a cornucopia for the class, 
the lawyers for the class were entitled . . . to suitable compensa-
tion for their efforts.”90 The district court judge, Posner ruled, had 
arbitrarily placed a $175 ceiling on the lawyers’ hourly rates, in 
spite of the fact that defense counsel were paid much more and 
that market rates, more generally, were much higher.91 Class law-
yers were also entitled to market rates for paralegals and com-
puterized research, to prejudgment interest, and to a risk multi-
plier that reflected the chance that they might be paid nothing at 
all.92 The district court judge had “cut legal research time by 40 
percent on the ground that experienced securities counsel don’t 
need to do much research,” an argument Posner dismissed as 
“clearly incorrect,” as “[n]o one carries the whole of federal secu-
rities law . . . around in his head, and a lawyer who tries to re-
spond to a motion or brief without conducting fresh research is 
courting sanctions or a malpractice suit.”93 Recognizing that some 
judges may be unwilling or unable to conduct the calculations nec-
essary to determine an appropriate fee, Posner suggested “ap-
pointment of a special master to advise the court.”94 
In sum, Posner’s class action jurisprudence required district 
court judges to conduct economically informed scrutiny of the 
terms of settlements, including fee awards. While such scrutiny 
was often conducted based on suspicion that class counsel had 
 
 88 962 F2d 566 (7th Cir 1992). Westlaw search, citing references of Reynolds, Feb 
2019 (listing 1,551 total citing references); Westlaw search, citing references of Continental, 
Feb 2019 (listing 1,926 total citing references). 
 89 Continental, 962 F2d at 568, 574. 
 90 Id at 568. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id at 569–70. 
 93 Continental, 962 F2d at 570. 
 94 Id at 573. 
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acted in self-interested fashion, it could also be used to ensure 
that class counsel received market rates for work on behalf of the 
class. 
III.  CITATION ANALYSIS 
The table below provides some quantitative evidence of Posner’s 
influence by comparing citation of Posner’s class action decisions 
to those of other Seventh Circuit judges during the period when 
Posner was a judge. 
TABLE 1:  CITATION ANALYSIS 
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23,559   6,618   3,735   88,641   
 
The table looks only at cases involving class action issues, 
such as certification, settlement approval, and attorneys’ fees. 
The figures for the Seventh Circuit (excluding Posner) are based 
on a one-third systematic sample.95 The first column shows cita-
tions in the Seventh Circuit, including cases from district courts 
 
 95 All Seventh Circuit appellate decisions using the phrase “class action” were sorted 
by Westlaw’s “Most Cited” function. The second, fifth, eighth, and every third opinion 
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in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Surprisingly, Posner’s opin-
ions are cited, on average, less often than those of other Seventh 
Circuit appellate judges (forty-six versus seventy times). In con-
trast, if one looks at citations outside the Seventh Circuit, where 
precedent is persuasive rather than binding, Posner’s average ci-
tations are 50 percent higher than his colleagues’ (forty versus 
twenty-seven). Similarly, when looking at citations in law re-
views, Posner’s average is more than twice that of his colleagues. 
Posner’s lead in all citations—which includes citations in non–
law review secondary sources and in trial briefs—is also signifi-
cant, although not as dramatic. In considering the figures in the 
table, it is important to note that the Seventh Circuit, for most of 
the time Posner was on the bench, also included several other dis-
tinguished jurists, including Frank Easterbrook. 
As discussed in the introduction, citation analysis provides 
only one measure of Posner’s influence. Other, less quantitative 
measures, such as his influence on the FRCP and on practition-
ers, may be more persuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
Posner’s class action jurisprudence had a profound effect, espe-
cially through its influence on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Posner pushed the federal courts to examine certification deci-
sions and the approval of settlements more rigorously so as to en-
sure that class actions served both justice and class members and 
to prevent both coercive and collusive settlements. He encouraged 
district court judges to act as fiduciaries for the class because he 
thought agency problems inherent in class action litigation made 
normal adversary procedures an inadequate safeguard for plain-
tiffs’ interest. Although his opinions are sometimes misinter-
preted as evincing hostility toward class action lawyers and class 
actions generally, he recognized that class actions and the law-
yers who bring them serve an important function in improving 
access to justice, especially when many persons are injured in 
ways that result in claims that are individually small, but large 
in aggregate. 
 
thereafter were examined to see if it contained resolution of a class action issue, and, if it 
did, it was analyzed. To calculate total citations, the citation in the one-third sample was 
multiplied by three. 
